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More than a Footnote in History: The Single-Purpose Container Exception 
I. Introduction 
The bane of law students and a useful tool for scholars, the lowly footnote has a 
long and acrimonious history in scholarly works. Often overlooked by students because 
of its perceived insignificance, scholars use the footnote to lend legitimacy to their own 
works by adding much-needed authority or credibility. Throughout Supreme Court 
opinions, the seemingly trivial footnote can have an ostensibly disproportionate impact 
on modern jurisprudence. One
1
 of the most evident examples of this was in Arkansas v. 
Sanders, where the court declared in the thirteenth footnote that a reasonable expectation 
of privacy does not extend to certain containers because “their contents can be inferred 
from their outward appearance.”2 At first glance, the Sanders footnote may seem as 
“innocuous” as the white powder found in United States v. Miller,3 but over 30 years later 
courts still wrestle with the application of this footnote. Eventually deemed the “single-
purpose container exception,”4 the Sanders footnote has been construed as an exception 
to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, potentially impacting an individual’s 
privacy interests. 
 The Fourth Amendment guards against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
specifically providing that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
                                                        
1 Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 163, 165 (stating that footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co. “has become the most 
famous footnote in constitutional law” and introduced the idea of different levels of scrutiny).  
2 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (U.S. 1979), overruled on other grounds by California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (U.S. 1991). 
3 United States v. Miller, 769 F.2d 554, 555 (9th Cir. 1985). 
4 Id. at 559. 
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or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seize.
5
 
 
As consistently demonstrated in case law, the Fourth Amendment does not 
actually require that searches or seizures be conducted pursuant to a warrant, it merely 
mandates “that warrants which may issue shall only issue upon probable cause.”6  
Although the Fourth Amendment affords broad protection to individuals from 
governmental intrusion, the amendment is subject to several limitations, restricting its 
scope. The amendment only protects individuals from “searches” and “seizures” 
perpetrated by government agents.
7
 It does not prohibit searches and seizures conducted 
by private persons.
8
 If an initial search occurs that is not prohibited by the Fourth 
Amendment, such as a search conducted by a private party, then a later search by an 
officer would not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as it did not exceed the scope of 
the original private search.
9
 Under the amendment, a search occurs when an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy is invaded.
10
 When determining whether a search is 
reasonable, the general approach under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is to 
examine the totality of the circumstances.
11
  
Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
12
 have been established by the courts where 
it has been determined that the public interest requires some flexibility in the application 
                                                        
5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
6 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 427 (U.S. 1981)(Rhenquist J., dissenting), overruled on other 
grounds by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
7 Id. at 113. 
8 United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1434 (10th Cir. 1991). 
9 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (U.S. 1984). 
10 Id. 
11 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (U.S. 2006)(explaining that the reasonableness of a search “is 
determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, 
on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”). 
12 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735-736 (U.S. 1983). 
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of the warrant requirement to searches.
13
 Due to this need for flexibility, there are “a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”14 where the protections of the 
Warrant Clause may be suspended.
15
 These exceptions are applied when the societal 
costs
16
 of obtaining a warrant outweigh the need for seeking the impartial opinion of a 
magistrate.
17
 
Regardless of these certain exceptions, probable cause is still generally required 
for any search or seizure conducted by a police officer.
18
 When determining whether 
probable cause exists, courts have generally moved away from the objective, reasonable 
person standard and toward the viewpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, 
giving “due weight to inferences” made by law enforcement officers.19 Probable cause is 
a “common-sense standard” that does not require the officer’s belief to actually be 
correct.
20
 Instead, it requires the facts or circumstances before an officer to be of the type 
to warrant a reasonably prudent officer to believe that an offense has been committed.
21
 
Once probable cause is established the next inquiry is whether a person retains a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.
22
 Courts are split on the standard used when deciding 
whether a container reveals its contents under the single-purpose container exception, 
eliminating any reasonable expectation of an individual’s privacy interest.23 This note 
examines the history of the single-purpose container and the circuit split it has created. 
                                                        
13 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (U.S. 1979). 
14 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). 
15 Sanders, 442 U.S. at 759. 
16  Id. (noting circumstances including “danger to law officers or the risk of loss or destruction of 
evidence.”). 
17  Id. 
18 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (U.S. 1987). 
19 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (U.S. 1996). 
20 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (U.S. 1983). 
21 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (U.S. 1925). 
22 Stephen Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of Fourth 
Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. Rev. 907, 914 (1997). 
23 United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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Part II(A) of this note will cover the reasonable expectation of privacy, while Parts II(B) 
and II(C) will discuss the plain view doctrine and the single-purpose container exception, 
respectively. Part III will examine the circuit split that has been created by the Sanders 
footnote. Specifically, Part III(A) will look at the 4th and 7th Circuits’ approach to the 
single-purpose exception, which considers the totality of the circumstances, giving due 
deference to the subjective inferences made by the searching officer. Part III(B) will look 
at the approach taken by the 1st, 5th, 9th, and 10th Circuits, which consider only whether 
the outward appearance of a container reveals its contents to a reasonable layperson. 
Finally, Part III(C) analyzes the circuit split, arguing that an analysis that focuses solely 
on an objective layperson’s inferences is too restrictive, the evaluation of the nature of 
the container should be from the perspective of a police officer, accounting for the 
officer’s training, expertise, and experience, and that the totality of circumstances should 
be weighed in determining the existence of a single-purpose container. 
 
II. Background 
A. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy under the Fourth Amendment 
An individual’s right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment is the “right to be 
let alone by other people.”24 To determine whether an individual has a Fourth 
Amendment privacy right, modern courts apply the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test, formulated by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Katz v. United States.
25
 The 
reasonable expectation of privacy test has two requirements: The person must have an 
actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and that expectation must be one that society 
                                                        
24 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (U.S. 1967). 
25 Jones, supra note 22, at 914. 
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believes is reasonable.
26
 Prior to Katz, the Supreme Court constricted privacy protection 
under the Fourth Amendment only to physical intrusions on tangible objects.
27
 In Katz, 
the Supreme Court parted ways with this narrow view and recognized that Fourth 
Amendment protection extended to include intangible items as well.
28
 The broad 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment adopted by the Katz Court allowed the 
amendment to adapt to the contemporary times and marked a “new” way to view an 
individual’s right to privacy.29 
When determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, courts 
must also balance an individual’s privacy rights with the promotion of legitimate 
government interests.
30
 In Maryland v. Buie, the Supreme Court stated, “in determining 
reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”31 Under this test, 
although a search is generally not reasonable unless it is accompanied by a warrant on 
probable cause, there are certain contexts where a warrant or probable cause is not 
required for the sake of the public interest.
32
 One example where the promotion of a 
legitimate interest of the government outweighs an individual’s privacy interests under 
the Fourth Amendment can be found in Carroll v. United States.
33
 In Carroll, the 
Supreme Court established an exception to the warrant requirement for moving 
                                                        
26 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan J., concurring). 
27 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (U.S. 1928). 
28 Katz, 389 U.S. at 355. 
29 Jones, supra note 22, at 914 (“Katz represents the “new” way of thinking about the Fourth Amendment 
and how it protects individuals.”). 
30 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (U.S. 2006)  
31 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (U.S. 1990). 
32 Id. 
33 267 U.S. 132, 153 (U.S. 1925) 
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vehicles.
34
 The Court stated that it would be impracticable to require officers to obtain a 
warrant before searching a vehicle because “the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the 
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought,” thus impeding law 
enforcement.
35
 Years later, the Supreme Court would once again find that an individual’s 
privacy rights were outweighed by law enforcement’s interests in Terry v. Ohio.36 In 
Terry, the Supreme Court upheld a “stop-and-frisk” search of a suspect that was 
performed without a warrant or even probable cause.
37
 The court upheld the search on the 
grounds that the officer not only had a reasonable basis to believe that the suspect was 
armed, but there was a prevailing public interest in the officer taking swift action.
38
 In 
determining whether the swift action taken by the officer was necessary, the court gave 
deference to the experience and subjective inferences made by the officer.
39
  
The surrounding circumstances of a search may also affect a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy. In California v. Ciraolo, after receiving an anonymous tip, police 
officers observed and took pictures of marijuana plants growing in the suspect’s backyard 
from a private airplane.
40
 Based on the pictures taken from the flight, the officers then 
obtained a warrant to seize the marijuana plants.
41
 Considering the circumstances of the 
case, the court held that the suspect did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy from 
all observations in his backyard.
42
 Even though the area was within the “curtilage”43 and 
                                                        
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 392 U.S. 1, 30 (U.S. 1968). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 23. 
40 476 U.S. 207, 209 (U.S. 1986). 
41 Id. at 209-10. 
42 Id. at 212. 
43 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300(1987)(noting that curtilage originated from common law to 
extend to the area immediately surrounding a dwelling. The Fourth Amendment protects the curtilage of a 
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the suspect had erected a fence to obstruct the public view of the street,
44
 the court 
examined the context of the search and the fact that the marijuana plants were not 
enclosed, open to view from the public airspace, as justification for its holding.
45
 
Although Ciraolo may have had a subjective expectation of privacy, since his plants were 
open to public view, that expectation was not objectively reasonable and thus was not 
protected.
46
 Like the marijuana plants in Ciraolo, items that can be observed in “plain 
view” have no expectation of privacy. 
 
B. The Plain View Doctrine 
One of the traditional exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement 
is the plain view doctrine. Under the plain view doctrine, there is no invasion of privacy 
when an object is observed in plain view of a public space.
47
 Obviously, when an object 
is exposed to the plain view of the public, no reasonable person could have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in that object.
48
 Therefore, there is no need for a search warrant.
49
 
The doctrine is based on the theory that once a police officer is lawfully in a position to 
observe an item,
50
 and it is exposed to the general public, “its owner's privacy interest in 
that item is lost.”51  
                                                                                                                                                                     
house. “The extent of the curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon whether an individual 
reasonably may expect that the area in question should be treated as the home itself.”). 
44 Ciraolo, 476 U.S at 209. 
45 Id. at 212-14. 
46 Id. at 215. 
47 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (U.S. 1990). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (U.S. 1987)(stating that “looking at what is already exposed to 
view” does not constitute a search).  
51 Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (U.S. 1983). 
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The plain view doctrine allows a police officer to conduct a warrantless seizure 
only when two conditions are met.
52
 First, as discussed above, the officer must “lawfully 
make an initial intrusion or otherwise properly be in a position from which he can view a 
particular area.”53 Second, it must be “immediately apparent” to the officer that the items 
observed may be subject to seizure.
54
 Prior to 1990, the plain view doctrine also required 
that the evidence discovered by the officer be made “inadvertently.”55 In Horton v. 
California, the Supreme Court rejected this third requirement, stating “evenhanded law 
enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather 
than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.”56 
In Arizona v. Hicks, the Supreme Court held that probable cause is required for an 
officer seizing an object under the plain view doctrine.
57
 The court in Hicks reasoned that, 
during an unrelated search and seizure, an object should not be seizable on grounds lesser 
than those needed to obtain a warrant.
58
 Since Hicks, courts have “recognized that a law 
enforcement officer may rely on his training and experience to draw inferences and make 
deductions that might well elude an untrained person.”59 This deferral to police officers 
includes their determination of objects within plain view.
60
 Although deference is given 
to officers to determine objects that are in plain view, the Supreme Court has held that the 
doctrine would not be extended to general exploratory searches between objects until 
                                                        
52 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (U.S. 1983). 
53 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
54 Id. 
55 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467-68 (U.S. 1971). 
56 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (U.S. 1990)(positing that the fact that an officer expects to find 
an item of evidence in the course of a search should not invalidate the seizure). 
57 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (U.S. 1987) 
58 Id. at 327. 
59 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 746 (U.S. 1983)(Powell J., concurring). 
60 Id. 
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something incriminating emerges.
61
 Instead, deference is only given to officers where it is 
immediately apparent that they have evidence before them.
62
 
Although the plain view doctrine may allow the warrantless seizure of an item, it 
does not allow for a warrantless search of the contents of that item.
63
 In United States v. 
Jacobsen, the Supreme Court stated “even when government agents may lawfully seize 
such a package to prevent loss or destruction of suspected contraband, the Fourth 
Amendment requires that they obtain a warrant before examining the contents of such a 
package.”64 As a general rule, when an officer lawfully seizes a container or package 
without a warrant, the officer is still required to obtain a warrant before searching the 
item.
65
 There are several exceptions to this general rule, such as searches incident to a 
lawful arrest or inventory searches.
66
 A lesser-known and more controversial exception 
that the courts have established is the single-purpose container exception. 
 
C. The Single-Purpose Container Exception 
The single-purpose container exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment was created in footnote thirteen of Arkansas v. Sanders.
67
 In that footnote, 
the Supreme Court posited that not all containers and packages found by police officers 
would deserve full protection under the Fourth Amendment.
68
 The court stated, “some 
                                                        
61 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466 (U.S. 1971)(internal quotations omitted). 
62 Id. 
63 United States v. Miller, 769 F2d 554, 557 (9th Cir. 1985)(“The plain view exception permits seizure of 
incriminating evidence, but does not authorize a warrantless search for concealed evidence.”).   
64 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (U.S. 1984). 
65 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 141 n.11 (U.S. 1990)(noting that the seizure of a container under the 
plain view doctrine ordinarily “does not compromise the interest in preserving the privacy of its contents 
because it may only be opened pursuant to either a search warrant, or one of the well-delineated exceptions 
to the warrant requirement.”). 
66 Brown, 460 U.S. at 735-36. 
67 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (U.S. 1979). 
68 Id. 
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containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot 
support a reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from 
their outward appearance.”69 Fundamentally, the court in Sanders stated that not all 
containers are “created equal in terms of one’s privacy expectation in them.”70  
 In Robbins v. California, the Supreme Court expanded upon the exception, 
asserting it to be a variation of the plain view doctrine.
71
 The court’s plurality held that 
“unless the container is such that its contents may be said to be in plain view, those 
contents are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment.”72 Ordinarily, a warrant is 
necessary before police may open a closed container because by concealing the contents 
from plain view, the possessor creates a reasonable expectation of privacy.
73
 But, if the 
characteristics or configuration of the container are such that it “proclaims its contents,” 
the contents are considered to essentially be in plain view and no reasonable privacy 
expectation is present.
74
 Similar to objects that sit out in the open, exposed to the public, 
the contents of some containers are treated like objects observed in plain view. Like items 
seized under the plain view doctrine, since the contents of a single-purpose container is 
considered to be open to public view, no actual Fourth Amendment “search” occurs when 
the container is examined because no expectation of privacy can exist.
75
 Because single-
                                                        
69 Id. 
70 United States v. Sylvester, 848 F.2d 520, 524 (5th Cir. 1988). 
71 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 427 (U.S. 1981) 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. (“If the distinctive configuration of a container proclaims its contents, the contents cannot fairly be 
said to have been removed from a searching officer's view.”).   
75 United States v. Davis, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17217, *136 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 2012)(stating that since 
the contents of the container was a foregone conclusion to the officer, his “observation of those contents 
did not constitute a search, and thus a search warrant was unnecessary”). 
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purpose containers so clearly announce their contents to an observer, they are effectively 
transparent.
76
 
Applying the Sanders footnote, the Robbins court held that the single-purpose 
container exception did not justify the warrantless search of packages described as 
“plastic wrapped green blocks” that were found in the defendant's trunk.77 In coming to 
its decision, the plurality disregarded that the officers had smelled marijuana smoke when 
the defendant opened his car door; that marijuana and drug paraphernalia was found in 
the passenger compartment of the car; and the suspect’s statements to the officer.78 The 
conviction was overturned because the prosecution could not establish that marijuana was 
ordinarily “packaged this way.”79 Instead, the court’s reasoning countered the officer’s 
testimony that “contraband was often wrapped in this fashion.”80  
 In Texas v. Brown, the Supreme Court applied a different rationale to uphold the 
warrantless seizure of opaque balloons containing heroin.
81
 Unlike the court in Robbins, 
the Brown court took into consideration the circumstances surrounding the container and 
the experience of the officer, holding that “the distinctive character of the balloon itself 
spoke volumes as to its contents – particularly to the trained eye of the officer.”82 
Although the majority in Brown did not reference the Sanders footnote and the single-
                                                        
76 United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 725 (10th Cir. 1992)(“[W]here the contents of a seized container 
are a foregone conclusion, [the] prohibition against the warrantless searches of containers under the plain 
view doctrine does not apply.”).  
77 Robbins 453 U.S. at 428. 
78 Id at 422, 428. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 442 (Rehnquist J., dissenting). 
81 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 744 (U.S. 1983). 
82 Id. at 742 (emphasis added). 
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purpose container exception, Justice Stevens’s concurrence posited, “the balloon could be 
one of those rare single-purpose containers.”83 
 Prior to Robbins and Brown, the Supreme Court briefly addressed the single-
purpose container exception in a footnote in Walter v. United States.
84
 In Walter, FBI 
agents conducted a warrantless search of a film box, inadvertently shipped to the wrong 
address, which depicted pornographic images and had explicit descriptions of the 
contents.
85
 The court held the government search to be unreasonable because Walter’s 
expectation of privacy should have been measured at the time he originally sent the 
container.
86
 Since the film boxes sent were securely wrapped and had no markings 
indicating its contents, Walter had an expectation of privacy.
87
 Although the court held 
the search to be unreasonable, the majority made the comparison to a gun case being 
delivered in the mail, noting that if the package had simply been a gun case there would 
be no expectation of privacy in that container.
88
 But, if that same gun were delivered in a 
locked, nondescript suitcase, then there would be an expectation of privacy in its 
contents.
89
 Applying the comparison to the facts of the case, had the film boxes not been 
in a container and had been mailed directly, it is likely that there would be no expectation 
of privacy in those containers and thus could have been searched by the FBI agents. This 
comparison could only be made if the FBI agents were allowed to consider the labels and 
depictions of the box making the film box’s incriminating contents immediately 
                                                        
83 Id. at 751 (Stevens J., concurring). 
84 Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 658 n.12 (U.S. 1980). 
85 Id. at 651-52. 
86 Id. at 658 n.12. 
87 Id. at 658-59. 
88 Id. at 658 n.12 
89 Id. 
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apparent.
90
 Since the Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue, or a concrete 
application of the Sanders footnote altogether,
91
 circuit courts have inconsistently applied 
the single-purpose container exception, creating a circuit split. 
 
III. Analysis of The Circuit Split  
All circuits agree on the constitutionality of the single-purpose container 
exception, but they disagree on how to determine the existence of a single-purpose 
container and whether the circumstances surrounding the search can be considered in 
making that determination.
92
 The 4th and 7th Circuits take the viewpoint that whether a 
container reveals its contents is determined by not only the configuration of the container 
itself, but the surrounding circumstances, including the officer’s knowledge and 
experience.
93
 The 1st, 5th, 9th, and 10th Circuits have taken the approach that the 
existence of a single-purpose container should be determined from an objective, 
reasonable person perspective and the extrinsic circumstances of the search should not be 
taken into consideration.
94
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
90 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 736-37 (U.S. 1983)(stating that in order to seize an object in plain view 
the incriminating nature of the item must be immediately apparent). 
91 United States v. Miller, 769 F2d 554, 559 (9th Cir. 1985)(discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the single-purpose container exception in Robbins). 
92 Compare United States v. Gust, 405 F3d 797, 803 (9th Cir 2005)(holding that “courts should assess the 
nature of a container primarily with reference to general social norms rather than solely . . . by the 
experience and expertise of law enforcement officers”) (quotation marks omitted), quoting United States v. 
Miller, 769 F2d 554, 560 (9th Cir. 1985) with United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 196-97 (4th Cir 
1994) (holding that a detective's experience could be used in assessing the character of a container). 
93 Allison M. Lucier, Comment, You Can Judge a Container by Its Cover: The Single-purpose Container 
Exception and the Fourth Amendment, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1809, 1820. 
94  Id. 
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A. The 4th and 7th Circuit Approach 
In United States v. Williams, the 4th Circuit upheld an officer’s search of 
packages that were heavily wrapped in cellophane and a layer of brown opaque 
material.
95
 The court reasoned that the packages closely resembled packages containing 
narcotics regularly seized by law enforcement.
96
 The court noted that the suitcase the 
packages were found in contained only dirty blankets and towels, items not typical when 
a person is traveling.
97
 The court also considered the fact that the officer conducting the 
search had ten years of experience in drug enforcement and, based on that experience, the 
officer testified that similarly wrapped packages had “always” contained narcotics.98 This 
novel approach taken by the 4th Circuit was substantially different than the approaches 
taken by any other circuit applying the single-purpose container exception at that time.
99
 
Then, in United States v. Davis, the 4th Circuit reaffirmed and strengthened its 
position that an officer’s knowledge and the surrounding circumstances may be taken into 
consideration when determining whether the contents of a container are immediately 
apparent.
100
 In Davis, the defendant was charged with murder after his DNA was a “cold 
hit” with DNA found at a murder scene.101 Four years prior, the defendant had previously 
been shot in the leg and at the hospital an officer searched the plastic hospital bag 
containing the defendant’s clothes.102 The blood on the defendant’s clothes was later used 
                                                        
95 United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1994). 
96 Id.  
97 Id. (“[T]he contents of the suitcase also spoke volumes.”). 
98 Id. at 194. 
99 Compare United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1994)(considering the searching officer’s 
years of experience and the “very unusual” items that accompanied the container) with United States v. 
Miller, 769 F.2d 554, 560 (9th Cir. 1985)(rejecting the assertion that the searching officer’s “considerable 
experience and expertise in drug enforcement” made the contents apparent). 
100 United States v. Davis, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17217, *21 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 2012). 
101 Id. at *3-*9. 
102 Id. 
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to create a DNA profile when he was suspected of committing a previous murder.
103
 The 
court noted the officer’s knowledge of the hospital’s practice of placing patients’ clothing 
in a bag on the shelf under the bed, the fact that the officer was aware the defendant was 
shot in the leg, and that defendant only had a hospital gown on as reasons why the 
contents of the bag were a forgone conclusion and could be searched.
104
 The fact that the 
bloody clothing with a bullet hole would be incriminating evidence against the shooter 
was also immediately apparent, to both the officer and the court.
105
 
In United States v. Tejada, the 7th Circuit noted the circuit split but decided not to 
expressly take any one side because the search of a bag containing cocaine had already 
been validated by inevitable discovery.
106
 Although the court did not explicitly take a side 
in the circuit split, the court in dicta conjectured that requiring a warrant to search a 
container when its contents are known to contain contraband or other incriminating 
evidence “is far from the core of the Fourth Amendment.107 Additionally, based on the 
7th Circuit’s previous opinion in United States v. Cardona-Rivera, the court would likely 
examine the surrounding circumstances in deciding whether a container revealed its 
contents. In United States v. Cardona-Rivera, the 7th Circuit upheld the search and 
seizure of packages that were recognized by the officers as “bricks” of cocaine.108 The 
court noted that once the defendant disclosed that the container held contraband, there 
was no reasonable privacy interest that could be invaded when the officers opened the 
package, regardless if a warrant was present.
109
 In Cardona-Rivera, Judge Posner also 
                                                        
103 Id. 
104 Id. at *23. 
105 Id. at *25. 
106 524 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2008). 
107 Id. at 814. 
108 United States v. Cardona-Rivera, 904 F.2d 1149, 1154 (7th Cir. 1990). 
109 Id. at 1156. 
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noted that if the question of when a container revealed its contents were presented to the 
Supreme Court, a majority of Justices would likely take into consideration the 
circumstances surrounding the container.
110
 
The 4th and 7th Circuits take a practical approach to determining the existence of 
a single-purpose container. The two circuits recognize that containers are not found in a 
vacuum and are willing to consider the surrounding circumstances prior to the search.  
Distinctive configuration, labels and disclosures made by suspects, the proximity of 
contraband, and the subjective inferences based on prior experience made by the 
searching officer will all be taken into account to determine whether the contents of a 
container are a forgone conclusion. 
 
B. The 1st, 5th, 9th, and 10th Circuits’ Approach 
 The approach taken by the other circuits in applying the exception is drastically 
different than that taken by the 4th and 7th Circuits. In United States v. Meada, the 1st 
Circuit applied a reasonable layperson standard in deciding whether firearms and 
ammunition found in several closed containers, which, in the context of the case, 
belonged to a convicted felon that was prohibited from owning such items, received a 
privacy expectation.
111
 The court held that the defendant did have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the ammunition can because the appearance of the can itself did 
not reveal its contents to the average person.
112
 Although the defendant had an 
expectation of privacy in the ammunition can, the court ruled any privacy interests the 
                                                        
110 Id. at 1155 (“Several Justices -- almost certainly a majority -- believe however that if the shape or other 
characteristics of the container, taken together with the circumstances in which it is seized (from a 
suspected drug dealer, or a harmless old lady?), proclaim its contents unambiguously, there is no need to 
obtain a warrant.”). 
111 408 F.3d 14, 24 (1st Cir. 2005). 
112 Id. at 19. 
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contents of the container holding the firearms was eliminated because the container was 
“readily identifiable as a gun case and included a ‘GUN GUARD’ label.”113 While the 1st 
Circuit limited the application of single-purpose container in Meada, the court did not 
completely eliminate its application. The court rejected Meada’s argument that if a 
container could potentially hold other items it did not clearly reveal its contents, noting 
that the Sanders exception would have no applicability if such a scenario could defeat 
it.
114
 
The 5th Circuit has taken an even narrower approach than the 1st Circuit when 
determining the existence of a single-purpose container. In United States v. Sylvester, the 
5th Circuit held that a container whose contents could not be deduced simply by looking 
at it fell outside of the scope of the Sanders footnote.
115
 The defendants in Sylvester were 
cited for hunting on a baited field after a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service agent searched 
through the defendant’s “hunting box” near the baited area.116 The court reasoned that 
although ammunition may often be carried in such boxes, the contents could not be 
inferred from the outward appearance of the box.
117
 Unlike the 1st Circuit in the 
aforementioned case, the 5th Circuit has held that labels on a container, do not 
necessarily destroy an individual’s privacy interest in that container.118 According to the 
5th Circuit, even disclosures made by defendants about the contents of a container do not 
destroy a defendant’s privacy expectation.119 In United States v. Villarreal, customs 
agents searched a fifty-five gallon drum labeled as phosphoric acid without a warrant and 
                                                        
113 Id. at 23. 
114 Id. at 24 (“The fact that, upon opening and careful inspection, the gun case might turn out to contain 
something other than a gun was irrelevant.”).   
115 United States v. Sylvester, 848 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 1988). 
116 Id. at 523. 
117 Id. at 525. 
118 United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 776 (5th Cir. 1992). 
119 Id. 
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found marijuana inside.
120
 The 5th Circuit held that although the drum was labeled, the 
label itself does not transform the container into a single-purpose container, allowing an 
officer to search its contents.
121
 The court in Villarreal also stated that even when a 
defendant informed a police officer of the contents of the container, he still preserved his 
privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment.
122
 The 5th Circuit departed from every other 
circuit in Villarreal by holding that the label on a container would not even be considered 
as part of the “outward appearance” of the container.123 The 5th Circuit’s approach in 
Villarreal is by far the narrowest of any court’s application of the single-purpose 
container, nearly destroying the exception altogether.  
The 9th Circuit joined the circuit split over the Sanders footnote in United States 
v. Miller where a Drug Enforcement Agency officer searched a clear plastic bag owned 
by the suspect that had punctured, spilling a white powder.
124
 Although the white powder 
tested negative for cocaine in a field test, upon further examination of the bag, the officer 
found an opaque, fiberglass container that enclosed crystalline cocaine.
125
 The 9th Circuit 
held that although the initial seizure of the bag was lawful under the plain view doctrine, 
the warrantless search of the bag was not.
126
 The court stated that since “the bag did not 
have a distinctive shape or odor that identified its contents” it did not “announce to the 
observer” that it contained contraband and therefore could not be considered a single-
purpose container.
127
 The court rejected the government’s assertion that the contents of 
                                                        
120 Id. at 772-73. 
121 Id. at 776. 
122 Id. (“It goes without saying that a defendant can orally inform a police officer what is in a container, yet 
stand on his rights and refuse to allow the officer to search that container.”). 
123 Id. (“[A] label on a container is not an invitation to search it.”). 
124 United States v. Miller, 769 F2d 554, 555 (9th Cir. 1985). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 557. 
127 Id. at 560. 
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the bag were obvious to the searching officer because the circumstances surrounding the 
discovery of the bag and the officer’s “considerable experience and expertise in drug 
enforcement” made the contents apparent.128 In coming to its conclusion, the court 
distinguished the Supreme Court’s decisions in Brown129 and Jacobsen130 on the grounds 
that those cases involved seizures rather than searches of a container, possibly implying 
that only the seizure of a single-purpose container may be based on an officer’s 
experience and training.
131
 
The 9th Circuit would later reestablish its stance that the viewpoint of a 
reasonable layman should be used in determining the existence of a single-purpose 
container in United States v. Gust.
132
 In Gust, The court found that a defendant’s shotgun 
case was not a single-purpose container because “a layperson would not be able to infer 
the contents of the case based on its outward appearance alone.”133 The court disregarded 
the fact that the officers had received reports of gunshots in the area, that they both had 
first-hand experiences with similar gun cases, and that the label “BUSHMASTER,” the 
name of a manufacturer and distributor of firearms, appeared on the case.
134
 The court 
also noted concerns that officers may abuse their discretion if the single-purpose 
                                                        
128 Id. (stating that the government’s assertion conflicts with the plurality’s opinion in Robbins, which 
“measures expectations of privacy with reference to general social norms.”) 
129 Id. at 559 (“The Brown plurality did not mention footnote 13 of Sanders, and it decided a different issue 
from the one that footnote 13 addressed.”). 
130 Miller 769 F.2d, at 559(“Jacobsen does not control the outcome of this case because the question here is 
whether the single-purpose container exception justifies a warrantless search conducted by a government 
agent pursuant to a proper government seizure.”). 
131 Id. 
132 United States v. Gust, 405 F.3d 797, 804 (9th Cir. 2005). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
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container exception were to apply without the restriction of the objective layperson as a 
standard.
135
 
The 10th Circuit joined the fray over the single-purpose container exception in 
United States v. Bonitz when the court rejected the contention that an officer’s experience 
should be taken into consideration when a container reveals its contents.
136
 In Bonitz, The 
court ruled that the hard plastic case that held an AR-15 rifle did not reveal its contents 
even though a firearms expert or the officers conducting the search may have been able to 
identify the plastic case as a gun case.
137
 A vigorous dissent by Judge Baldock advocated 
for a more subjective approach, stating that the officers could reasonably surmise the 
contents of the container based on their experience, specialized knowledge, and the 
context in which the container was found.
138
 Although the majority in Bonitz determined 
that an officer’s experience could not be used to determine the existence of a single-
purpose container, Judge Baldock’s dissent indicated a potential divide among the circuit 
as to whether surrounding circumstances could be used to infer the contents of a 
container. 
Four years later, in United States v. Donnes, the 10th Circuit approached the issue 
once again and reasserted its previous holding in Bonitz that only the configuration of the 
container itself would be considered when determining the existence of a single-purpose 
                                                        
135 Id. at 802 (stating that holding otherwise, “could result in a rule that essentially permits law enforcement 
to conduct warrantless searches of indistinct and innocuous containers based solely on probable cause 
derived from the officers’ subjective knowledge and the circumstances.”). 
136 826 F.2d 954, 956 (10th Cir. 1987). 
137 Id. (casting doubt that any hard plastic gun case could disclose its contents, opining that the Sanders 
footnote would probably only extend to “well-known, soft zippered gun cases.”). 
138 Id. at 960 (Baldock J., dissenting)(“The search was conducted by experienced officers who had 
knowledge of defendant's felony conviction and acquisition of firearms, and who observed the hard plastic 
case among several soft-sided gun cases. The experienced officers were able to recognize the plastic case as 
a gun case, and could thus reasonably infer its contents.”). 
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container.
139
 In Donnes, the court held that an opaque, leather camera case did not qualify 
as a single-purpose container even though a syringe accompanied it, in plain view, when 
the container was initially found.
140
 The court held that since the bindles of 
methamphetamines were found in a closed camera lens case made of black leather, that 
was placed inside a glove, and located on the floor of his house, “the defendant clearly 
manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the camera lens 
case.”141 Relying on Bonitz, the court casted doubt on whether the single-purpose 
container exception could ever be applied at all,
142
 stating that a container reveals its 
contents under the single-purpose exception only when the container is either not closed, 
transparent, or has a distinctive configuration.
143
 The 10th Circuit reasoned that if it gave 
weight to the fact that the lens case was found with a syringe it would essentially “permit 
a warrantless search of any container found in the vicinity of a suspicious item.”144 Such 
an expansion on the single-purpose container exception would likely increase the amount 
of warrantless searches of nondescript containers as long as the container was found near 
an item that could be considered suspicious.
145
 
As described above, the majority of circuits take an approach to the single-
purpose container exception that is much narrower than the 4th and 7th Circuits’ 
approach. Instead of considering the extrinsic circumstances around the container, these 
circuits consider only the distinctive configuration of the container itself. When 
                                                        
139 United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1437 (10th Cir. 1991). 
140 Id. at 1439. 
141 Id. at 1436. 
142 Id. at 1438 (“If a hard plastic case containing a gun does not subject its contents to plain view, certainly 
a camera lens case does not subject its contents to plain view.”). 
143 Id. at 1437 (“[W]hen a container is not closed, or transparent, or when its distinctive configuration… 
proclaims its contents, the container supports no reasonable expectation of privacy and the contents can be 
said to be in plain view.”). 
144 Id. at 1438. 
145 Donnes 947 F.2d at 1437-38. 
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determining whether a container is a single-purpose container, the majority of circuits do 
not consider the searching officer’s experience or subjective inferences, opting for a 
reasonable person standard instead. 
 
C. Resolution to the Circuit Split 
1. An analysis that focuses solely on an objective layperson’s inferences is too 
restrictive. 
 
A judicial approach that only considers how a reasonable layperson would view a 
container is too narrow of an approach if it does not consider the context in which the 
container was found or the surrounding circumstances. Situations often arise where there 
could be no reasonable expectation of privacy because the extrinsic circumstances around 
the container make its contents a foregone conclusion. For example, this type of situation 
arose in Gust when a suspect explicitly told the officer that there was a gun inside a 
suspicious looking container.
146
 An admission of the sort should have been considered a 
waiver of the suspect’s privacy interest, since the officer was effectively certain of the 
container’s contents.147 Under the approach taken by the court in Gust, however, the 
admission by the suspect was not even considered because the court only looked at the 
container on its face, not the context in which it was found.
148
 
An objective layperson perspective is also prone to as many, if not more, 
inconsistencies as the subjective officer perspective. For example, there have been 
inconsistent rulings where a suspect owned a gun case with the name of a firearm 
                                                        
146 United States v. Gust, 405 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2005). 
147 United States v. Cardona-Rivera, 904 F.2d 1149, 1156 (7th Cir. 1990)(stating that once the defendant 
“admitted that his package contained a contraband substance, no lawful interest of his could be invaded by 
the officers' opening the packages.”). 
148 Gust 405 F.3d. at 802 
 23 
manufacturer labeled on its exterior. In those cases, courts have disagreed over whether a 
layperson would be able to recognize the label and the firearm case.
149
 In all three 
instances, however, the officers were able to determine that the cases contained a gun 
because of their prior experiences with firearms.
150
 
 
2. The nature of the container should be determined from the perspective of a police 
officer and should account for the officer’s training, expertise, and experience. 
 
The deference the single-purpose container exception provides to officers is 
undeniably beneficial to society because the productivity and efficiency of law 
enforcement increase as less time and resources are devoted to seeking search warrants. 
An evaluation from the perspective of the searching police officer provides indisputable 
flexibility to law enforcement. Decisions regarding whether a container clearly 
announced its contents are more easily made when officers are able to factor in their 
experience and the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the container. An 
objective layperson analysis requires a police officer to perform the difficult task of 
deciding if a container qualifies as a single-purpose container without taking into account 
his or her own experience or the circumstances.
151
 Instead, this standard forces officers to 
pretend that they are laypeople, something they are not and which is not easy to achieve. 
Any officer necessarily “views the facts through the lens of his police experience and 
expertise.”152 When determining the contents of a container, it would be unrealistic to 
                                                        
149 Compare United States v. Gust, 405 F.3d 797, 804 (9th Cir. 2005)(“A layperson would not be able to 
infer the contents of the case based on its outward appearance alone.”) with United States v. Meada, 408 
F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 2005)(stating that the container was “readily identifiable as a gun case and included a 
‘GUN GUARD’ label.”). 
150 Gust 405 F.3d. at 802. 
151 Id. (“it is difficult to evaluate the nature of a container without regard for the context in which it is found 
or the fact that the searching officer had special reasons to believe the container held contraband”). 
152 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (U.S. 1996).  
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expect an officer to separate himself from his experiences and first-hand knowledge. Not 
only that, but it would also be impractical to expect an officer to view specific containers 
from a layperson’s perspective, since law enforcement officers are specifically trained to 
make determinations as to the possible contents of suspicious containers.  
 Officers are often given deference in their daily decision making because of their 
ability to spot incriminating activity.
153
 Because of their career experience, training, and 
first-hand knowledge, law enforcement officers are better equipped than a layperson in 
determining the types of containers or methods used for criminal activity.
154
 A trained 
law enforcement officer has the ability to use objective facts that may seem insignificant 
to a layperson and use those facts to form a legitimate suspicion of a person or package 
that may be acted on.
155
 The belief that considering the subjective perspective of a police 
officer to be a “sham” is simply unfounded.156 The concern that using a subjective 
determination allows officers to act on a hunch, and when “the hunch proves to be correct 
and the arrest bears fruit, the court will hold . . . that the record firmly supports the 
detective’s inference,”157 is actually counter to what the Supreme Court has held in the 
past.
158
 When considering an officer’s subjective assessment of a situation, the court has 
held that “due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the 
                                                        
153 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 (2006)(Kennedy J., concurring)(“Our system, as the Court 
explains, has developed procedures for training police officers and imposing discipline for failures to act 
competently and lawfully.”). 
154 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 746 (U.S. 1983)(Powell J., concurring)(“A law enforcement officer may 
rely on his training and experience to draw inferences and make deductions that might well elude an 
untrained person.”). 
155 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419 (U.S. 1981). 
156 United States v. Prandy-Binett, 995 F.2d 1069, 1074 (D.C. 1993)(Edwards J., dissenting)(stating that if 
an officer’s “hunch proves to be correct and the arrest bears fruit, the court will hold, as here, that the 
record firmly supports the detective's inference. This is a sham.”). 
157 Id. 
158 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (U.S. 1968). 
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facts in light of his experience.”159 In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court upheld an on-the-
street search, or a “stop-and-frisk,” by a police officer as being reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.
160
 In coming to its decision, the court examined the officer’s 
observations of the suspect, which led to the subsequent search.
161
  Like the searching 
officer in Terry, even when an officer subjectively believes that a container holds 
contraband, he will still be required to point to specific facts that established his belief.
162
 
If the inferences made by the officer are not reasonable, then it is unlikely that the court 
will uphold the search.  
Requiring an officer to obtain a warrant to search a container that he is virtually 
certain contains contraband or incriminating evidence can have negative implications on 
law enforcement.
163
 Well-intentioned mistakes in the application of the single-purpose 
container exception by law enforcement officers can have significant consequences since 
the punishment for failure to obtain a search warrant can lead to the suppression of highly 
relevant evidence.
164
 Confusion among officers between the application of the plain view 
doctrine and its byproduct, the single-purpose container exception, could expectedly lead 
to police error and the suppression of important evidence.
165
 In order to seize an object 
under the plain view doctrine, the officer must be in a lawful position to view the item 
and the incriminating nature of the item must be immediately apparent.
166
 When 
                                                        
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 30-31. 
161 Id. at 21 (“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion.”). 
162 Id. 
163 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 433 (U.S. 1981). 
164 United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2008). 
165 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 768 (1979) (Blackmun J., dissenting) (Explaining that confusions in 
the law create difficulties for police, prosecutors, and the courts). 
166 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 736-37 (U.S. 1983). 
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determining whether the item’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent, the officer 
“may rely on his training and experience to draw inferences and make deductions that 
might well elude an untrained person.”167 Allowing an officer to use his experience and 
training to seize an item in plain view but requiring that officer to use a layperson’s 
perspective to determine whether that same item can be searched creates two conflicting 
standards that may cause confusion and impede law enforcement.
168
 In Acevedo, the 
Supreme Court overturned Sanders because it conflicted with the Carroll-doctrine cases 
and caused confusion among the courts and officers, obstructing effective law 
enforcement.
169
 The court reasoned that it would be more efficient to adopt a single, 
clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches.
170
 Likewise, adopting one clear-cut standard 
in deciding when an item is siezable under the plain view doctrine and searchable as a 
single-purpose container would remove confusion by police officers and reduce 
inconsistencies among the courts.
171
 Although an individual’s privacy rights from 
seizures is distinct from their privacy rights from searches, the opening of a container is 
not generally seen as being that much more intrusive than the seizure of the same 
container.
172
 Since the privacy distinction between a search and a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment is minute, a plain view interpretation that allows an officer to search 
                                                        
167 Id. at 746 (Powell J., concurring). 
168 Robbins 453 U.S. at 436 (Blackmun J., dissenting)(explaining that the standards for searching containers 
in an automobile under Chadwick and Sanders conflicted with the Court’s holding in Carroll, which could 
lead to confusion over proper procedure among law enforcement.) 
169 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (U.S. 1991). 
170 Id. 
171 Daniel Kegl, The Single-Purpose Container Exception: A Logical Extension of the Plain View Doctrine 
Made Unworkable by Inconsistent Application, 30 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 237, 268 (“Just as the Supreme Court 
adopted one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches, it needs to adopt an equally clear-cut rule to 
govern the single-purpose container exception so that its application is uniform across the circuits.”). 
172 Wayne R. LaFaye, Search and Seizure § 6.7 (b) (2d ed. 1987). 
 27 
a container when there is solid evidence of the container’s contents should be attractive to 
courts and officers alike.
173
 
Permitting law enforcement officers to rely on their expertise and professional 
knowledge in determining whether a container reveals it contents under the single-
purpose container exception properly balances individual privacy concerns and 
government interests. Requiring an officer to obtain a warrant to search a package or 
container in which they have probable cause or considerable evidence to believe that the 
package contains some type of contraband can substantially frustrate law enforcement 
efforts.
174
 The ability of an officer to obtain a warrant is not always as easy as making a 
quick, half-mile trip to the nearest precinct.
175
 The time expended on the process to 
secure a search warrant for a container the officer is virtually certain contains contraband 
is an inefficient use of police resources as that time could be spent on patrol, investigating 
crimes, or making arrests.
176
 Overall, the productivity and efficiency of law enforcement 
would increase as less time and resources are devoted to obtaining search warrants. 
Additionally, an individual’s privacy rights are not necessarily sacrificed when an officer 
uses his expertise to determine the existence of a single-purpose container under the 
Sanders footnote. Containers that fall under the single-purpose container exception are 
“rare.”177 Although it is possible that the scope of the exception may extend to more 
packages or containers when applying the specialized knowledge of a police officer, any 
                                                        
173 Id. 
174 Robbins, 453 U.S. at 438 (Rhenquist J., dissenting). 
175 Id. at 438-39 (Rhenquist J., dissenting) (“[T]his casual assumption simply does not fit the realities of 
sparsely populated "cow counties" located in some of the Southern and Western States, where at least 
apocryphally the number of cows exceed the number of people, and the number of square miles in the 
county may exceed 10,000 and the nearest magistrate may be 25 or even 50 miles away.”). 
176 Id. at 433 (Powell C.J., concurring)(Stating that the process of obtaining a warrant “may take hours, 
removing the officer from his normal police duties.”). 
177 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 751-52 (U.S. 1983)(Stevens J., concurring). 
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expansion would be minimal. It would be unlikely that the characteristics of nondescript 
containers, like a backpack or a purse, could “proclaim its contents,” even to the trained 
eye of an officer.
178
 
 
 
3. The totality of circumstances should be weighed in determining the existence of a 
single-purpose container. 
 
The surrounding circumstances and the context in which a container is found 
should be taken into consideration because these containers are not found in a vacuum. It 
would be unreasonable to expect an officer to view each container he or she comes across 
as being in a bubble, separate from the outside world. Circumstances and locations often 
play a major part in determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.
179
 
For example, an individual’s expectation of privacy changes when the person is in a 
vehicle or in their home.
180
 In the home, an unlabeled gun case may also be mistaken for 
a violin case. But if that same case were to be found in or near a gun range, it would be 
almost a foregone conclusion to most people that the case contained a firearm.
181
 To use 
another example, it would also be inconsistent to say that a person that places wrapped 
cellophane “bricks” or a gun case next to another incriminating item, like a syringe, still 
observes a reasonable expectation of privacy. Considering the surrounding circumstances 
of a search is not unfounded as an approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In fact, 
it is the prevailing Supreme Court-created doctrine. For example, in Terry, the Court not 
                                                        
178 Allison M. Lucier,You Can Judge a Container by Its Cover: The Single-purpose Container Exception 
and the Fourth Amendment, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1809, 1834. 
179 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (U.S. 1982)(“The protection afforded by the Amendment 
varies in different settings.”). 
180 New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 124 (U.S. 1986)(Brennan J., dissenting)(“An individual's justifiable 
expectation of privacy in a vehicle is less than in his home.”).   
181 Lucier, supra note 176, at 1833 (“While a gun case may not look like a gun case to the average person, a 
gun case next to a box of bullets would begin to look more like a gun case to the average person.”). 
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only considered the observations made by the officer prior to the search, but also 
considered the officer’s years of experience on the force.182 After weighing all these 
facts, including the competing privacy interests of the defendant, the Court came to the 
conclusion that the warrantless search was reasonable.
183
 
Courts, such as the 10th Circuit in Donnes, have been reluctant to include the 
context in which the container is found because of a concern that it may “permit a 
warrantless search of any container found in the vicinity of a suspicious item.”184 This 
trepidation expressed by the 10th Circuit overstates the case. Containers that have 
nondescript characteristics, like a cardboard box, found in the vicinity of contraband, 
could never be considered a single-purpose container since the character of the container 
would not change regardless of its location.
185
 Unexceptional containers, like a cardboard 
box, are used to carry an infinite variety of items. Although a box that is accompanied by 
incriminating evidence, like a syringe or white powder, may be more likely to carry 
contraband, nothing about the characteristics of the box change.
186
 Outside of specific 
disclosures made by the owner of the box, the surrounding context of where the box is 
found is unlikely to make the characteristics of the box incriminating.  Moreover, 
considering the totality of circumstances in which a container is found safeguards against 
such unconstitutional searches since the vicinity of contraband in which the container is 
found may be only a single, non-dispositve factor amongst a multitude of other factors 
the court will consider.  
                                                        
182 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (U.S. 1968). 
183 Id. at 30. 
184 United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1438 (10th Cir. 1991). 
185 Lucier, supra note 176, at 1834. 
186 Id. 
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Once a suspect discloses information about the contents of a container to an 
officer, their privacy interest in that container is frustrated under the Fourth 
Amendment.
187
 In Jacobsen, the Supreme Court stated that once a defendant reveals 
information to another, there is an assumed risk that the person may later reveal that 
information to government agents.
188
 A government agent is not prohibited from acting 
on that information under the Fourth Amendment because it then becomes “nonprivate” 
information.
189
 Likewise, if a person were to disclose information to an officer directly, a 
reasonable expectation of privacy could no longer exist because that information would 
become nonprivate. It would be illogical for an officer to disregard comments made by a 
defendant concerning the contents of the container. In Cardona-Rivera the suspect 
admitted that there was cocaine in the container prior to the officer’s search.190 Since 
such disclosure would make the contents of the container readily apparent (even to a 
layman), an officer should be able to search the container without a warrant. 
A label on the outside of a container is comparable to disclosures made by the 
owner of the container.
191
 Like information revealed by the owner, a label on a container 
is nonprivate information since it appears on the outside of the container for the world to 
see. Labeling a plain, black case “GUN GUARD,” “Phoenix Arms,” or 
“BUSHMASTER” removes the owner’s expectation that the contents will remain 
                                                        
187United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (U.S. 1984). 
188 Id. (“It is well settled that when an individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk 
that his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit governmental use of that information”). 
189 Id. (stating that once frustration of the original expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit governmental use of the now nonprivate information). 
190 United States v. Cardona-Rivera, 904 F.2d 1149, 1156 (7th Cir. 1990). 
191 United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2005)(stating that the label on the gun case 
betrayed the container, revealing the container’s contents). 
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private.
192
 Since the information is nonprivate and because a label reveals the intended 
purpose of the container, a government agent should be able to act on it. These type of 
containers fall directly into the category of single-purpose containers under the Sanders 
footnote because “their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.”193  
 
IV. Conclusion 
The bedrock of American’s privacy rights, the Fourth Amendment requires all 
government searches to be reasonable.
194
 When determining the reasonableness of an 
individual’s privacy expectations, courts must be cognizant of the balance between an 
individual’s right to privacy and the legitimate interests of the government.195  Any court 
decision must balance these competing interests. It is also not sufficient that an individual 
has a subjective expectation of privacy. That expectation must also be one that is 
objectively considered reasonable.
196
 
A variation of the plain view doctrine, the single-purpose container exception is 
an efficient tool for police officers. The deference the exception provides to officers is 
beneficial to society because as less time and resources are devoted to seeking search 
warrants, more time can be spent on patrol, investigating crimes, and making arrests. The 
exception allows law enforcement officials to quickly locate and remove contraband on 
the street. In the overwhelming majority of cases involving the single-purpose container 
                                                        
192 Banks, 514 F.3d at 774 (noting that label on the defendant's container made clear, even to the average 
person, that it contained a gun). 
193 Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764 n.13. 
194 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
195 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (U.S. 1990). 
196 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (U.S. 1967)(Harlan J., concurring). 
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exception, the officers’ expertise and experience did not lead them astray.197 In each case, 
the officers’ insights were accurate and the containers in question were found to have 
contraband when searched.
198
 It would also be unworkable to force upon officers the 
difficult task of making these important determinations without taking into account the 
officer’s experience199 or the surrounding circumstances.200 Since law enforcement 
officers are specifically trained to make these types of determinations, courts should 
weigh the subjective knowledge and experience of the searching officer when 
determining the existence of a single-purpose container. 
The totality of circumstances should also be considered when making the 
determination of whether a container reveals its contents. Containers are never found 
separate from the rest of the world. Court precedent has often considered the totality of 
the circumstances in other cases involving warrantless searches or seizures pursuant to 
the Fourth Amendment.
201
 It seems only logical to allow officers to consider the context 
in which the container is found when determining whether it is one of the “rare”202 
single-purpose containers. Disclosures about the contents of a container, either through 
                                                        
197 United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, (1st Cir. 2005).; United States v. Williams, 41 F3d 192, 196-97 
(4th Cir 1994).; United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 725 (10th Cir. 1992).; United States v. Cardona-
Rivera, 904 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1990). 
198 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 746 (U.S. 1983)(Powell J., concurring)(discussing how a trained officer 
may be able to make inferences based on their experience that an untrained layperson would not be able to 
make). 
199 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (U.S. 1996)(stating that an officer “views the facts through 
the lens of his police experience and expertise.”). 
200 United States v. Gust, 405 F3d 797, 802 (9th Cir 2005)(noting the difficulty in evaluating a container 
without considered the context or the subjective inferences made by the searching officer). 
201 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (U.S. 1968).; California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (U.S. 1986).; 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (U.S. 1991). 
202 Brown, 460 U.S. at 751 (Stevens J., concurring)(discussing that an opaque balloon may be “one of those 
rare single-purpose containers.”). 
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the suspect directly or through the labels on a container, are also nonprivate information 
that an officer should be able to act on.
203
  
Considering the totality of circumstances while deferring to the expertise and 
experience of the searching officer properly balances an individual’s privacy rights under 
the Fourth Amendment with legitimate government interests. Deference to a police 
officer’s expertise allows law enforcement the flexibility to make on-the-spot 
determinations, promoting a government interest in public safety. While police deference 
may seem to tip the scale in favor of the government, the totality of circumstances test 
prevents this by requiring the inferences made by an officer be only one of many factors, 
preserving an individual’s privacy rights. Considering either element alone may allow 
one interest to outweigh the other, but by implementing both factors together the scale is 
properly balanced. 
                                                        
203 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (U.S. 1984)(noting that authorities acting off of 
information revealed to them, or nonprivate information, is not prohibited under the Fourth Amendment). 
